2026:AHC:55241-DB

AFR
Judgement reserved on 18.02.2026
Judgement delivered on 18.03.2026

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 4607 of 2017

Lakhmi and 2 others

…..Appellant(s)

Versus

State of U.P.

…..Respondent(s)

Counsel for Appellant(s)	:	Abhishek Kumar Chaubey, Anand Prakash Paul, Brij Bhushan Paul, Dharmendra Kumar Chaubey, Lal Vijai Singh, Pravin Kumar Tiwari, Sunil Kumar Shukla
Counsel for Respondent(s)	:	Government Advocate

Court No. - 48

HON'BLE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J.
HON'BLE DEVENDRA SINGH-I, J

(Per: Hon’ble Chandra Dhari Singh, J)

1. This criminal appeal has been filed against a judgement and order dated 06.07.2017 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Anoopshahr (Bulandshahr) in ST No. 310 of 2012 arising out of case crime No. 400 of 2011, under Sections 302/34, 307/34, 509/34 and 506 IPC, police station Dibai, district

Bulandshahr whereby the learned Judge convicted and sentenced the appellants Lakhmi, Languri and Yogesh as under:

(a) Life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 50,000/- each under Section 302/34 IPC and in case of default in payment of fine, six months' additional simple imprisonment.

(b) Twelve years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 25,000/- each under Section 307/34 IPC and in case of default in payment of fine, three months' additional simple imprisonment.

(c) Two years simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/- each under Section 509/34 IPC and in case of default in payment of fine, fifteen days additional simple imprisonment.

Appellant Languri and Yogesh were further convicted and sentenced to two years simple imprisonment under Section 506 IPC.

However, all the sentences of the appellants were directed to run concurrently.

2. By the same impugned judgement and order, the learned Judge acquitted appellant Lakhmi of the offence under Section 506 IPC.

Facts of the case

3. The facts that formed the bedrock of the present criminal appeal, in short compass, are that a written report was given by Devi Singh, son of Nannu Singh, resident of Danapur, police station Dibai, district

Bulandshahr with the allegations inter alia that his nephew Lakhmi Singh, son of Karan Singh was harbouring animosity due to the land of his brother Chhiddu, because Chhiddu has got the deed (*Wasiyat*) of his land done in favour of his son Het Ram. Lakhmi Singh was demanding share in that land. The first information report further recounts that on 30.12.2011, his wife Chameli Devi along with her grandson-Krishna Kumar aged about 6 years was coming to her house from her field, appellant Lakhmi and his sons Languri and Yogesh, were sitting in ambush in front of the house of Komal. Appellant-Lakhmi was armed with Lathi and Daav (Banka), appellant-Languri was having knife and appellant Yogesh was carrying gun and as soon as his wife came under the tree of *Jamun* at 03:15 PM, all the three appellants with common intention surrounded her wife and knocked her down and made indiscriminate firing on her and also assaulted her with *Daav* and knife and all of them beheaded her wife and hung the head on the tree. The appellants also cut the stomach of the deceased. The first information report further alleges that his grandson (*Nati*) has also received fire arm injury. On hearing the noise, when he along with his son Het Ram and Heera Lal and several persons of the village rushed to the spot and on being challenged, the accused Languri and Yogesh fled away from the spot extending threat, whereas appellant-Lakhmi armed with Daav, started jumping and dancing near the corpse, due to which no one could dare to apprehend him. Chaos erupted in the village. Woman closed their doors and law and order situation in the area got disturbed. Police

reached at the spot and apprehended the accused along with *Daav*.

4. On the basis of the aforesaid report, a case was registered at case crime No. 400 of 2011, under Section 302/34 IPC, police station Dibai, district Bulandshahr.

5. After the registration of the case, the investigation of the case was taken up by PW-6, SO Umesh Chandra Pachauri. He inspected the spot and prepared site plan, Ext. Ka-12. He arrested the accused-Lakhmi from the spot along with weapon of assault and recorded the statement of witnesses Hakim Singh and Pappu Singh. He collected bloodstained and simple earth from the place of occurrence. He also taken steps to take down the head of the deceased from the tree. He also prepared memos of bloodstained *Trishul* and *Daav*. The clothes wore by the appellant-Lakhmi, i.e. bloodstained Kurta, bloodstained Dhori, Safi were taken into possession, sealed and memo whereof was prepared, which were also signed by the investigating officer as well as the appellant-Lakhmi, Ext. Ka-13. Since, the accused-appellants Yogesh and Languri surrendered before the Court on 10.01.2012, he made an application before the court concerned for remand of the appellants Langurai and Yogesh, which was allowed by the court concerned on 19.01.2012. On 20.01.2012, on the pointing out of accused-Languri he recovered knife and on the pointing out of accused-Yogesh, he recovered gun. After the recovery of the aforesaid items on the pointing out of accused-Lauguri and Yogesh, a case at case crime No. 57 of 2012, under section 4/25 of the

Arms Act and 58 of 2012 under Section 25 Arms Act were also registered against the accused Languri and Yogesh and after preparing warrants under the Arms Act, they were sent to jail. He also inspected the place from where weapon of assault, i.e. knife and gun were recovered and prepared site plan, Ext Ka-14. Thereafter, this witness (PW-6, SO Umesh Chandra Pachauri) has been transferred.

6. After the transfer of PW-6, SO Umesh Chandra Pachauri, the investigation of the case was taken up by Station House Officer, Ajay Kumar Agrawal, who sent the materials relating to the crime to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Agra on 25.03.2012 and after completing necessary formalities, he submitted charge sheet against the appellants.

7. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, learned Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions, where case was registered as ST No 310 of 2012 and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Anoopshahr vide order dated 20.04.2012 framed the charges against the appellants under Sections 302/34 IPC, 307/34 IPC, 509/34 IPC and 506 IPC. The charges were read over and explained to them, who denied the charges and claimed to be tried.

8. To bring home guilt of the appellants beyond the hilt, the prosecution has examined as many as eleven witnesses. PW-1, Devi Singh is the first informant, PW-2, Het Ram Verma is the son of the deceased, PW-3, CP Manoj Kumar, who was the Chik writer, PW-4, Dr Kishore

Kumar, Medical Officer, who conducted post-mortem on the cadaver of the deceased-Chameli Devi, PW-5, Dr. Surendra Goel, Medical Officer, who examined injured, Kishan Kumar, son of Chandra Pal Singh, PW-6, SO Umesh Chandra Pachauri, the first investigating officer of the case, PW-7, SI Atar Singh, who conducted inquest on the body of the deceased, Ext. Ka-6, PW-8, Krishna Kumar is the injured witness, PW-9 SI Jai Pal Singh is the witness of recovery of weapon of assault, PW-10, Dr. Mahesh Prasad Sharma, Deputy Director, Forensic Science Laboratory and PW-11, Sudhir Kuma Jha, Scientific Officer, Forensic Science Laboratory, Lucknow.

9. PW-1, Devi Singh is the husband of the deceased and the first informant of the case. In his examination-in-chief, he deposed that deceased-Chameli Devi was his wife and injured Krishna Kumar is his grandson. Accused-Lakhmi is real nephew (*bhatija*). He has four brothers, namely Chhiddu Singh, Karan Singh, Lal Singh and the appellant. Although several persons were born to Chhiddu Singh, but they died in the childhood. Chhiddu Singh started considering Het Ram as his son and got the deed registered of his asset in favour of Het Ram. In the year 1996, Chhiddu Singh died, the last rights of Chhiddu was performed by his son Het Ram. After the death of Chhiddu Singh, son of Karan Singh, namely Komal and Lakhmi started demanding share in the property of Chhiddu Singh and after preparing an unregistered deed, they have registered a false case against his son Het Ram. As Chhiddu Singh has given his land to Het Ram, appellant Lakhmi started harbouring internal animosity with him

and his son Languri and Yogesh were helping him. On 30.12.2011, his wife Chameli Devi along with her grandson krishna Kumar was coming to house from her field. Appelant Lakhmi and his sons Languri and Yogesh, who were sitting in ambush in room of the house of Komal. Lakhmi was armed with Daav, Languri was having knife and Yogesh was having gun and as soon as his wife came under the tree of Jamun at 03:15 PM, all the three appellants with common intention surrounded her wife and knocked her down. Yogesh made indiscriminate firing, whereas Lakhmi with Daav and Languri with knife assaulted her. All the three appellants beheaded her wife and cut the stomach with knife and also caused several injuries. His grandson Krishna Kumar also received firearm injury. Lakhmi uprooted the trident (Trishul) under the tree of Jamun and inflicted below the naval of her wife. He also unclothed the dead body and also hung head of the deceased from the tree. On hearing the noise, he along with several person of the vicinity rushed to the spot and on being challenged Languri and Yogesh fled away by extending threats, whereas Lakhmi armed with Daav, started jumping and dancing near the corpse, due to which no one could dare to apprehend him. In the meantime, police personnel from Daulatpur Chauki rushed there and apprehended the accused with weapon of assault, i.e. Daav. He also proved his written report as Ext. Ka-1.

10. It is also mentioned by PW-1, Devi Singh that prior to the incident in question, accused-Lakhmi has assaulted his daughter-in-law on 08.11.2011 with lathi and danda,

the case whereof is still going on in Court. His daughter-in-law to save, hid herself in the room of Tube well. Thereupon, Lakhmi Singh fired from the window, but the fire missed.

11. PW-2, Het Ram Verma is the son of the deceased and the first informant. In his examination-in-chief, he deposed that deceased was her mother, whereas Krishna Kumar is his nephew. Accused-Lakhmi is his cousin. The incident in question took place at 03:15 PM on 30.12.2011. When his mother and nephew were returning home from the field, appellants Lakhmi, Languri and Yogesh, were sitting in ambush. Lakhmi was armed with Daav, Languri with knife and Yogesh was having gun. As soon as her mother and nephew came under the tree of Jamun, all the accused persons surrounded them, knocked her mother down and made indiscriminate firing. On hearing the sound of fire, he along with his brother Heera Lal and father rushed to the spot and saw that they have beheaded her mother with Daav. Appellant-Languri cut her mother stomach apart from knife. Lakhmi uprooted trident (Trishul) from the root of tree and inflicted on the naval of her mother. His nephew Krishna Kumar received firearm injury on his leg. All the accused-appellants tied the head of her mother with rope and hung the same from the tree. Lakhmi had thrown out the intestine of her mother. When Lakhmi and Languri were beheading her mother, Yogesh was catching the leg of her mother. On arrival of several persons of the village, when they challenged the accused persons, accused Languri and Yogesh fled away extending threat, whereas accused

Lakhmi started jumping and dancing near the dead body with bloodstained Daav. Looking to the conduct of the appellant Lakhmi, every one was frightened. The women have closed their door and no one could dare to apprehend the accused Lakhmi. At the same time, police personnel from Daulatpur outpost reached there and apprehended him along with weapon of assault (Daav).

12. PW-2, Het Ram Verma further deposed that his father has four brothers, the elder one was Chhiddu Singh. He has got him educated and married. After his death, PW-2, also performed his last rights. During his lifetime, Chhiddu has made registered deed in his favour. After the death of his *Tau* (Chhiddu Singh), accused-Lakhmi Singh started demanding share in the property of Chhiddu Singh. On his refusal to give the share in the said property, Lakhmi and Komal made a forged deed of the said property and filed a suit against him. However, they have been defeated from all the courts and property has come in his name, due to which accused Lakhmi, Languri and Yogesh started harbouring enmity with him and committed the murder of his mother.

13. PW-2, Het Ram Verma also deposed that the report of the incident was lodged by his father. After lodging of the report, police also came to the spot. Police personnel made me to climb the tree of Jamun and brought the head of my mother down and got the clothes of my mother in right direction, who was lying half naked. The rope which was bloodstained and was about 14 feet was taken into possession, sealed it and made memo thereof,

which was signed by this witness and Om Prakash Gauram, which he proved as Ext. Ka-2.

14. Police also collected bloodstained and simple earth and also took into possession bloodstained trident (Trishul) and got it sealed and memo thereof. He also deposed that the police also took into possession bloodstained Daav (weapon of assault) and after keeping in a polythene, got it sealed in cloth.

15. PW-3, CP Manoj Kumar in his examination-in-chief deposed that on 30.12.2011 he was posted at police station Dibai as clerk. On that date, on the written information of Devi Singh, he prepared Chick No. 278 of 2011, case crime No. 400 of 2011, under Section 302, 307 IPC in his writing, which he proved as Ext. Ka-7, which was entered in GD on 30.12.2011 vide report No. 35 at 16:30 hours. He has proved the original GD as Ext. Ka-8.

16. PW-4, Dr. Kishore Kumar, in his examination-in-chief deposed that on 31.12.2011 he was posted as Medical Officer at District Hospital, Bulandshahr. On that date he conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of the deceased which was brought by Constable 606 Ram Pal Singh and Constable 1775 Amit Kumar of police station Dibai along with relevant documents. He conducted the post mortem at 09:30 AM on 31.12.2011 and found the following ante-mortem injuries:

> *"1. Incised wound through and through at the level of C-5 vertebrae, all structure of neck C vessels found under the injury. Head separated from rest of the body.*

> *2. Stab wound (incised) 20 cm x 2 cm located below the naval, deep into the abdominal intestines. Due to this injury, the small intestine was cut at several places and about 800 ml of blood present in abdomen."*

17. In the opinion of the doctor, the cause of death of the deceased was shock and haemorrhage as a result of ante mortem injuries and excessive bleeding.

18. PW-4, Dr. Kishore Kumar also deposed that after conducting the postmortem examination, he handed over the clothes of the deceased, Kameez, Dhoti and Petticoat, four toe rings and a piece of broken bangle to the constable who brought the dead body for postmortem in a sealed cover. He also handed over the dead body and postmortem report the the constable. He deposed that Injury No. 1 can be caused by sharp edged weapon, like knife and Injury No. 2 can be caused by sharp edged weapon like trident (*Trishul*).

19. PW-5, Dr. Surendra Goyal in his examination-in-chief deposed that on 30.12.2011 he was posted at CHC at Medical Officer. On that date he examined Kishan Kumar, son of Chandra Pal Singh, resident of Danapur, police station Dibai, who was brought by Home Guard 770 Vani Singh of PS Dibai, at about 04:55 PM on 30.12.2011. He found the following injuries on his person:

> *"Lacerated wound of size 2 cm x 1.5 cm x muscle deep on the lower and outer aspect of right thigh Blackening present around the wound. Fresh bleeding present."*

X-ray was advised and injury was kept under observation. Duration of the injury was fresh.

20. In the opinion of the doctor, the above injury was caused by firearm.

21. PW-6, Umesh Chandra Pachauri was the first investigating officer of the case, whose evidence has already been discussed above.

22. PW-7, SI Atar Singh in his examination-in-chief deposed that on 30.12.2011 he was posted at Daulatpur out-post of police statin Dibai as Sub-Inspector. On that date at 17:30 hours, he prepared inquest on the body of the deceased Chamai Devi, wife of Shri Devi Singh, which he proved as Ext. Ka-6. He also prepared letter to RI, Photo Lash, letter to CMO and specimen seal, which he proved as Ext. Ka 16 to 19.

23. PW-8, Krishna Kumar is the injured witness. At the time of recording of his examination-in-chief, he was aged about 11 years and six months. At the time of incident, i.e. 30.12.2011, he was aged about seven years and six months. Court has examined the child whether he is capable to answer the question correctly and on being satisfied, his evidence was recorded. In his examination-in-chief, he deposed that deceased-Chameli Devi was his grand-mother. Among the persons, who had killed his grand-mother, Lakhmi was armed with Daav, Languri was carrying knife and Yogesh was having gun. On the date of incident, i.e. 30.12.2011 at about 03:15 PM when he along with his grand-mother was returning from field and

as soon as they reached near the tree of Jamun, Yogesh fired at his grand-mother, which hit this witness on the thigh of his right leg. All the three accused knocked down her grand-mother. On his alarm, his grand-father Devi Singh, uncle (Kaka) Heera Lal and (Tau), Het Ram Verma rushed to the spot. Accused were assaulting his grand-mother. They beheaded his grand-mother from the weapons which they were carrying and hung her head from the tree. He further deposed that when his grand-father, Kaka and Tau challenged them, accused-Yogesh and Languri fled towards Jungle.

24. PW-9, SI Jaipal Singh was the witness of recovery of weapon of assault. He deposed that weapon of assault, i.e. knife and gun was recovered in his presence.

25. PW-10, Dr. Mahesh Prasad Sharma, Deputy Director, Forensic Science Laboratory in his examination-in-chief, has deposed that on 10.01.2014, he was posted at Forensic Science Laboratory, Dibai, district Bulandshahr. Materials pertaining to Case Crime No. 400 of 2011, under Sections 302,307, 506 and 509 IPC and 4/25 Arms Act, containing six bundles dated 10.04.2012 were received in his office. Bundle No. 1 contain Trident (Trishul), Bundle No.2 Banka, Bundle No. 3, knife, Bundle No. 4, Kurta Dhoti, Bundle No. 5, bloodstained earth and Bundle No. 6 simple earth. Aforesaid articles were examined. Articles kept in bundle Nos 1 to 6 were bloodstained. Articles kept in bundle Nos. 4 and 5 were having large bloodstained of 5 cm. Bundle Nos. 4 to 6

contained human blood. Blood on articles kept on bundle Nos. 1-3 was disintegrated.

26. PW-11, Sudhir Kumar Jha in his examination-in-chief deposed that on 10.09.2014 he was posted as Senior Scientific Assistant. On that date he received bloodstained and simple earth pertaining to Case Crime No. 400 of 2011, under Sections 302, 307, 506, 509 IPC. On examination, both bloodstained and simple earth were found the same, the report whereof was prepared by him under his signature, Ext. Ka-21.

27. After the closure of the prosecution evidence, the statements of the accused-appellants were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. in which, they denied the charges levelled against them. Accused-Lakhmi has stated that he was not present at the spot and he had been arrested by the police after calling him from home. Accused-Yogesh and Languri have stated that on the date and time of incident, they were not present in the village.

28. Five witnesses have also been produced in defence.

29. DW-1, Ramesh, in his evidence deposed that on 30.12.2011 he along with appellant-Languri, Kaushal, Manoj, Ram Prasad and Pankaj were on the brick kiln of Badaur. They left for brick kiln at about 08:00 AM and worked there till 05:00 PM. Appellant-Languri was with him throughout the day.

30. DW-2, Kaushal in his evidence deposed that appellant-Languri was with him on 30.12.2011 from 08:00 AM to 06:00 PM at the brick kiln.

31. DW-3, Constable 139 Vinod Kumar, presently posted at police station Dibai, district Bulandshahr, in his evidence deposed that pursuant to the order of the Court passed on the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C., he is present along with register of Maalkhana of the year 2011-2012. However, he deposed that he is only Pairokar and not competent to depose.

32. DW-4 HCP Amar Singh has been produced to enquire about Malkhana Register.

33. DW-5, Raj Kumar in his evidence has stated that he knows Devi Singh, who is the resident of Danpur and retired as Head Master. He deposed that on the date of incident when he was returning home after marketing, he saw that a beheaded body was lying. No person was present there. He was the first person to reach near the dead body. It was about 4:00 o'clock. However, he does not know the month and year. On his alarm, several persons of the locality assembled there. Family members of the deceased also reached. Police also reached at the place.

34. Learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Anoopshahr (Bulandshahr) after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and assessing, evaluating and scrutinizing the evidence on record, convicted and sentenced the accused-appellants as indicated herein above.

35. Hence, this appeal.

36. Heard Shri B.B. Paul, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Anand Prakash Paul, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri S.K. Ojha, learned Additional Government Advocate-Ist, representing the State and have gone through the record of the case.

Submissions on behalf of the appellats

37. Learned Counsel for the appellants contended that there is material contradictions in the statement of star witness PW-8, Krishna Kumar, which makes the entire prosecution story doubtful. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that PW-8, Krishna Kumar in his evidence at page No. 78 of the paper book has stated that when the accused were assaulting his grandmother, no person of the village was present there. Yogesh fired at his grand-mother, which hit this witness on the thigh of his right leg. All the three accused knocked down her grand-mother. Whereas at other place of his evidence at page No. 81 of the paper book this witness has stated that after being hit by the fire, he fled weeping and that he did not tell about the incident to his father, uncle and Tau (father's elder brother) and they reached the spot on hearing the noise. No person of the village rushed to the spot. Shri Paul also submitted that doctrine of Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus be applied in this case.

38. Learned counsel for the appellants heavily relied upon the statement of DW-5 Raj Kumar and submitted that the trial court has completely overlooked the facts narrated by DW-5 Raj Kumar in his statement.

39. Learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that PW-8, Krishna Kumar is a child witness and his statement should be considered following the dictum of Hon’ble Supreme Court as per settled principle of law on the subject.

40. Learned counsel for the appellants has also contended that the prosecution has not examined Komal in front of whose house, the occurrence took place and that the investigating officer has not examined the length of Jamun tree under which the occurrence took place, which is fatal for the prosecution.

41. Lastly, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that non-recovery of empty cartridge from the place of occurrence, makes the prosecution story doubtful.

Submission on behalf of the State

42. On the other hand, Shri S.K. Ojha, learned Additional Government Advocate supported the findings of the learned trial court by stating that the learned trial court has correctly martialled the evidence and considered each and every aspect of the case while convicting the appellants.

Analysis and conclusion

43. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is there are material contradiction in the evidence of PW-8, krishna kumar. In the depositions of witnesses there may always be some normal discrepancies. These discrepancies are due to lapse of

time and mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of the occurrence. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal and go to the root of the prosecution case and not expected of a normal person.

44. For the better appreciation of argument of learned counsel for the appellants on the point, it shall be useful to refer to certain pronouncement of Hon’ble Supreme Court on the point.

45. In **State of Rajasthan Vs. Kalki** (1981)2 SCC 752, Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:

> *“6. The second ground on which the High Court refused to place reliance on the evidence of P.W. 1 was that there were "material discrepancies". As indicated above we have perused the evidence of P.W. 1. We have not found any "material discrepancies" in her evidence. The discrepancies referred to by the High Court are, in our opinion, minor, insignificant, natural and not 'material'. The discrepancies are with regard to as to which accused "pressed the deceased and at which part of the body to the ground and sat on which part of the body; with regard to whether the respondent Kalki gave the axe blow to the deceased while the latter was standing or lying on the ground, and whether the blow was given from the side of the head or from the side of the legs. In the depositions of witnesses there are always some normal discrepancies however honest and truthful they may be. These discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of the occurrence, and the like. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. As*

indicated above we have not found any material discrepancies in the evidence of the P. W. 1."

46. In **State represented by Inspector of Police Vs. Saravanam and another,** (2008) 17 SCC 587, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions had been of such magnitude that they may materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters without effecting the core of the prosecution case should not be made a ground to reject the evidence in its entirety. The Trial Court, after going through the entire evidence, must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses and the appellate Court in normal course would not be justified in reviewing the same again without justifiable reasons.

47. In **State of U.P. Vs. M.K. Anthony**, (1985)1 SCC 505, Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

"While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, draw-backs and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the

core of the case, hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the : root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals. Cross examination is an unequal duel between a rustic and refined lawyer. Having examined the evidence of this witness, a friend and well-wisher of the family carefully giving due weight to the comments made by the learned Counsel for the respondent and the reasons assigned to by the High Court for rejecting his evidence simultaneously keeping in view the appreciation of the evidence of this witness by the trial court, we have no hesitation in holding that the High Court was in error in rejecting the testimony of witness Nair whose evidence appears to us trustworthy and credible."

48. In **State of Rajasthan Vs. Rajendra Singh**, (2009) 11 SCC 106 held as under:

"Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of a witness and

other witness also make material improvements before the court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it cannot be safe to rely upon such evidence."

49. In **Mahendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of Uttar Predesh,** (2009) 11 SCC 334) held as under:

"The discrepancies in the evidence of eye-witnesses, if found to be not minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and discrediting their evidence. In such circumstances, witnesses may not inspire confidence and if their evidence is found to be in conflict and contradiction with other evidence or with the statement already recorded, in such a case it cannot be held that prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt."

50. In the light of the aforesaid observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court, we will now consider whether the contradictions/omissions had been of such magnitude that they may have materially affected the trial. The contradiction pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that at one place PW-8, Krishna Kumar stated that when the accused were assaulting his grandmother, no person of the village rushed there. Yogesh fired at his grandmother, which hit PW-8 on his right thigh and all the three accused knocked her grandmother down (page No.

78 of the paper book). Whereas at the other place (page 81 of the paper book) PW-8, Krishna Kumar stated that after being hit by the fire, he fled weeping and did not tell about the occurrence to his father, uncle and Tau and they rushed to the spot on hearing noise and that no person of the village came at the place of occurrence. What, learned counsel for the appellants wants to submits that when PW-8, Krishna Kumar after being hit by the fire, fled from the place of occurrence, he did not have any occasion to see the occurrence.

51. This contention of the learned counsel is totally misconceived inasmuch at the place of occurrence, PW-8, Krishna Kumar was present along with his grandmother. As per his evidence, Yogesh fired at his grandmother, but the fired missed and hit PW-8 on the thigh of his right leg. PW-8, Krishna Kumar, to a specific question, during his cross examination, which was done on 04.06.2016 has specifically stated that fire was made from a very close range. PW-5, Dr. Surendra Goyal, who examined the injuries of PW-8, Krishna kumar also opined that blackening was present around the wound and fresh bleeding was present. From the evidence of PW-8 coupled with the opinion of PW-5, Dr. Surendra Goyal, it is clear that the fire was made from a very close range, which goes to suggest that all the accused persons as well as deceased and the injured PW-8 were present nearby and PW-8 after being hit by the bullet, fled towards his home, there was no difficulty for him to see the other part of the incident, wherein his grandmother was hacked to death by the accused. So far not giving information by PW-8,

Krishna Kumar to his father, uncle and Tau about the occurrence is concerned, it is the case of the prosecution that on hearing the noise, father, uncle and Tau of the injured themselves rushed to the spot and, therefore, no question arises for giving them information about the occurrence.

52. In view of the above, such a minor contradiction pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant is of no help to the appellants. Further the discrepancies pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant is very trivial in nature, which does not, in any way, affect the foundation of the prosecution case.

53. Further, so far as application of doctrine of "*falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus"* it is settled position of law that *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus* (false in one thing, false in every thing) that the above principle is foreign to our criminal law jurisprudence. This aspect of the matter has been considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of judgements.

54. In **Hangovan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu** (2020)10 SCC 533, held as under:

"The counsel for the appellant lastly argued that once the witnesses had been disbelieved with respect to the co-accused, their testimonies with respect to the present accused must also be discarded. The counsel is, in effect, relying on the legal maxim *"falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,* which Indian Courts have always been reluctant to apply. A three-Judge Bench of this Court, as far back as in 1957, in Nisar Ali Vs. State **of**

U.P., 1957 SCC OnLine SC 42 held on he point as follows:

> *"9.....This maxim has not received general acceptance in different jurisdictions in India nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of cation. All that is amounts to is that in such cases the testimony may be disregarded and not that it must be disregarded....*
>
> *10. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances but it is not what may be called "a mandatory rule of evidence..."*

55. In **Ram Vijay Singh Vs. State of U.P.,** (2021) 15 SCC 241, a three Judge Bench of Supreme Court held as under:

> *"We do not find any merit in the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. A part statement of a witness can be believed even though some part of the statement may not be relied upon by the court. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not the rule applied by the courts in India."*

56. Hence, as held above, it has been the consistent stand of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Principle *"falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus"* is not a rule of evidence and if the court inspires confidence from the rest of the

testimony of such a witness, it can very well rely on such a part of the testimony.

57. Next argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that the trial court has completely overlooked the the statement of DW-5 Raj Kumar.

58. DW-5, Raj Kumar, who is resident of another village Dangarh, in his evidence has stated that on the date of incident when he was returning home after marketing, he saw that a beheaded body was lying. No person was present there. He was the first person to reach near the dead body. It was about 4:00 o'clock. However, he does not know the month and year. On his alarm, several persons of the locality assembled there. Family members of the deceased also reached. Police also reached the place. DW-5, Raj Kumar was shown as a chance witness, who reached at the spot at 04:00 PM.

59. The first information report in the instant case has been lodged at 04:30 PM, at police station Dibai, which is allegedly 7 kms away from the place of occurrence in which the time of occurrence has been shown at 03:15 PM. In the first information report it has clearly been mentioned by the first informant that the incident in question took place at 03:15 PM. Further, PW-7, SI Atar Singh, in his cross-examination, which was recorded on 04.01.2017 deposed that on 30.12.2011, he was posted at Daulatpur police outpost, police station Dibai as Sub-Inspector. On that date, when he along with SI M.P. Singh and Constables Amit and Rampal was busy in maintaining law and order situation in the vicinity, at about 03:30 PM,

he received information from informer that a woman has been done to death. Believing on the said information, when he reached at the spot at about 03:45 PM, he found the beheaded body of a woman lying under the tree of Jamun near the house of Komal. Neck was hanging on the tree. A person carrying *Daav* with dancing near the dead body. There was a large crowd and the people was frightened. The police personnel arrested that person along with Daav and on enquiry he told his name as Lakhmi son of Karan Singh, resident of Danpur. PW-8, Krishna Kumar in his evidence has also stated that the incident took place at about 03:15 PM.

60. From the perusal of the statements of PW-1 Devi Singh, the first informant, PW-8, Krishna Kumar, the injured witness and PW-7, SI Atar Singh, who reached the spot at 03:45 PM and arrested the accused-appellant Lakhmi Singh, it is clear that the incident in question took place at 03:15 PM as claimed by the prosecution and the story set up by the defence through the evidence of DW-5 Raj Kumar has no leg to stand.

61. Next argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that PW-8 is a child witness and as his testimony is false and highly improbably and cannot be accepted.

62. Before, we deal with the aforesaid argument of learned counsel for the appellants, it would be apposite to refer certain pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the subject.

63. In **Dattu Ramrao Sakhare Vs. State of Maharashtra,** (1997) 5 SCC 341, Hon’ble Supreme Court

held that as long as a child witness is found to be competent to depose i.e., capable of understanding the questions put to it and able to give rational answers, the testimony of such witness can be considered as evidence in terms of Section 118 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of their tender age or absence of any oath. The only additional factor to be considered is that the witness must be found to be reliable, exhibiting the demeanour of any other competent witness, with no likelihood of having been tutored. It further clarified that there is no requirement or condition that the evidence of a child witness must be corroborated before it can be considered, and rather the insistence of any corroboration is only a rule of prudence that would depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.

The Court further held as under:

> *"A child witness if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis of conviction. In other words even in the absence of oath the evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the questions and able to give rational answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/her*

demeanour must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored. There is no rule or practice that in every case the evidence of such a witness be corroborated before a conviction can be allowed to stand but, however as a rule of prudence the court always finds it desirable to have the corroboration to such evidence from other dependable evidence on record."

64. In **Suryanarain Vs. State of Karnataka,** (2001)9 SCC 129, Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:

> *" The evidence of the child witness cannot be rejected per se, but the court, as rule of prudence, is required to consider such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality of the statements and its reliability, base conviction by accepting the statement of the child witness. The witness of PW2 cannot be discarded only on the ground of her being of Teen age. The fact of being PW2 a child witness would require the court to scrutinise her evidence with care and caution. If she is shown to have stood the test of cross-examination and there is no infirmity in her evidence, the prosecution can rightly claim a conviction based upon her testimony alone. Corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence. Some discrepancies in the*

statement of a child witness cannot be made the basis for discarding the testimony. Discrepancies in the deposition, if not in material particulars, would lend credence to the testimony of a child witness who, under the normal circumstances, would like to mix up what the witness saw with what he or she is likely to imagine to have seen. While appreciating the evidence of the child witness, the courts are required to rule out the possibility of the child being tutored. In the absence of any allegation regarding tutoring or using the child witness for ulterior purposes of the prosecution, the courts have no option but to rely upon the confidence inspiring testimony of such witness for the purposes of holding the accused guilty or not."

65. In **Ratansinh Dalsukhbhai Nayak Vs. State of Gujarat,** (2004) 1 SCC 64, Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that although child witnesses are considered as dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped and moulded yet it is an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny their testimony is found to inspire confidence and truthful, then there is no obstacle in accepting the evidence of such child witness.

The Court further held as under:

"The decision on the question whether the child witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests

with the trial Judge who notices his manners, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and the said Judge may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial court may, however, be disturbed by the higher court if from what is preserved in the records, it is clear that his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world of make-believe. Though it is an established principle that child witnesses are dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped and moulded, but it is also an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness."

66. In **Gagan Kanojia and another Vs. State of Punjab** *(2006) 13 SCC 516,* Supreme Court held that Part of the statement of a child witness, even if tutored, can be relied upon, if the tutored part can be separated from untutored part, in case such remaining untutored part inspires confidence. In such an eventuality the untutored part can be believed or at least taken into consideration for the purpose of corroboration as in the case of a hostile witness.

67. In **State of U.P. Vs. Krishna Master and others**, AIR 2010 SC 3071, this Court held that there is no principle of law that it is inconceivable that a child of tender age would not be able to recapitulate the facts in his memory. A child is always receptive to abnormal events which take place in his life and would never forget those events for the rest of his life. The child may be able to recapitulate carefully and exactly when asked about the same in the future. In case the child explains the relevant events of the crime without improvements or embellishments, and the same inspire confidence of the Court, his deposition does not require any corroboration whatsoever. The child at a tender age is incapable of having any malice or ill will against any person. Therefore, there must be something on record to satisfy the Court that something had gone wrong between the date of incident and recording evidence of the child witness due to which the witness wanted to implicate the accused falsely in a case of a serious nature.

68. In **State of U.P. v. Krishna Master** (2010) 12 SCC 324 this Court held that there is no principle of law that it is inconceivable that a child of tender age would not be able to recapitulate the facts in his memory. A child is always receptive to abnormal events which take place in his life and would never forget those events for the rest of his life. The child may be able to recapitulate carefully and exactly when asked about the same in the future. In case the child explains the relevant events of the crime without improvements or embellishments, and the same

inspire confidence of the court, his deposition does not require any corroboration whatsoever. The child at a tender age is incapable of having any malice or ill will against any person. Therefore, there must be something on record to satisfy the court that something had gone wrong between the date of incident and recording evidence of the child witness due to which the witness wanted to implicate the accused falsely in a case of a serious nature."

69. **In State of M.P. Vs Ramesh (**2011) 4 SCC 786, Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering a catena of decisions on the point, held as under"

> *"In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that the deposition of a child witness may require corroboration, but in case his deposition inspires the confidence of the court and there is no embellishment or improvement therein, the court may rely upon his evidence. The evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully with greater circumspection because he is susceptible to tutoring. Only in case there is evidence on record to show that a child has been tutored, the Court can reject his statement partly or fully. However, an inference as to whether child has been tutored or not, can be drawn from the contents of his deposition."*

70. Similarly in **Pradeep Vs. Haryana,** reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 777 Supreme Court emphasized on the importance of preliminary examination of a child witness. It held that although oat cannot be administered to a child witness under 12-years of age yet, as per Section 118 of the Evidence Act it is the duty of a Trial Judge to conduct a preliminary examination before recording the evidence of the child witness to ascertain if the child is able to understand the questions put to him and that he is able to give rational answers to the questions put to him. It held that the Trial Judge must record its opinion and satisfaction that the child witness understands the duty of speaking the truth and state why he is of the opinion that the child understands the duty of speaking the truth. It further held that the questions put to the child in the preliminary examination must also be recorded so that the appellate court can go into the correctness of the opinion of the Trial Court.

71. In a very recent judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in **State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Balveer Singh,** 2025 INSC 261, after considering a catena of judgements on the point summarised the law in the following words:

> "*(I) The Evidence Act does not prescribe any minimum age for a witness, and as such a child witness is a competent witness and his or her evidence and cannot be rejected outrightly.*
>
> *(II) As per Section 118 of the Evidence Act, before the evidence of the child witness is recorded, a preliminary examination must be*

conducted by the Trial Court to ascertain if the child-witness is capable of understanding sanctity of giving evidence and the import of the questions that are being put to him.

(III) Before the evidence of the child witness is recorded, the Trial Court must record its opinion and satisfaction that the child witness understands the duty of speaking the truth and must clearly state why he is of such opinion.

(IV) The questions put to the child in the course of the preliminary examination and the demeanour of the child and their ability to respond to questions coherently and rationally must be recorded by the Trial Court. The correctness of the opinion formed by the Trial Court as to why it is satisfied that the child witness was capable of giving evidence may be gone into by the appellate court by either scrutinizing the preliminary examination conducted by the Trial Court, or from the testimony of the child witness or the demeanour of the child during the deposition and cross-examination as recorded by the Trial Court.

(V) The testimony of a child witness who is found to be competent to depose i.e., capable of understanding the questions put to it and able to give coherent and rational answers would be admissible in evidence.

(VI) The Trial Court must also record the demeanour of the child witness during the course of its deposition and cross-examination and whether the evidence of such child witness is his voluntary expression and not borne out of the influence of others.

(VII) There is no requirement or condition that the evidence of a child witness must be corroborated before it can be considered. A child witness who exhibits the demeanour of any other competent witness and whose evidence inspires confidence can be relied upon without any need for corroboration and can form the sole basis for conviction. If the evidence of the child explains the relevant events of the crime without improvements or embellishments, the same does not require any corroboration whatsoever.

(VIII)Corroboration of the evidence of the child witness may be insisted upon by the courts as measure of caution and prudence where the evidence of the child is found to be either tutored or riddled with material discrepancies or contradictions. There is no hard and fast rule when such corroboration would be desirous or required, and would depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.

(IX) Child witnesses are considered as dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable to

be influenced easily, shaped and moulded and as such the courts must rule out the possibility of tutoring. If the courts after a careful scrutiny, find that there is neither any tutoring nor any attempt to use the child witness for ulterior purposes by the prosecution, then the courts must rely on the confidence-inspiring testimony of such a witness in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the absence of any allegations by the accused in this regard, an inference as to whether the child has been tutored or not, can be drawn from the contents of his deposition.

(X) The evidence of a child witness is considered tutored if their testimony is shaped or influenced at the instance of someone else or is otherwise fabricated. Where there has been any tutoring of a witness, the same may possibly produce two broad effects in their testimony; (i) improvisation or (ii) fabrication.

(i) Improvisation in testimony whereby facts have been altered or new details are added inconsistent with the version of events not previously stated must be eradicated by first confronting the witness with that part of its previous statement that omits or contradicts the improvisation by bringing it to its notice and giving the witness an opportunity to either admit or deny the omission or contradiction. If such omission or contradiction is admitted there is no further need to

prove the contradiction. If the witness denies the omission or contradiction the same has to be proved in the deposition of the investigating officer by proving that part of police statement of the witness in question. Only thereafter, may the improvisation be discarded from evidence or such omission or contradiction be relied upon as evidence in terms of Section 11 of Evidence Act.

(ii) Whereas the evidence of a child witness which is alleged to be doctored or tutored in toto, then such evidence may be discarded as unreliable only if the presence of the following two factors have to be established being as under: -

■ Opportunity of Tutoring of the Child Witness in question whereby certain foundational facts suggesting or demonstrating the probability that a part of the testimony of the witness might have been tutored have to be established.

This may be done either by showing that there was a delay in recording the statement of such witness or that the presence of such witness was doubtful, or by imputing any motive on the part of such witness to depose falsely, or the susceptibility of such witness in falling prey to tutoring. However, a mere bald assertion that there is a possibility of the witness in question being tutored is not sufficient.

■ Reasonable likelihood of tutoring wherein the foundational facts suggesting a possibility of

tutoring as established have to be further proven or cogently substantiated. This may be done by leading evidence to prove a strong and palpable motive to depose falsely, or by establishing that the delay in recording the statement is not only unexplained but indicative and suggestive of some unfair practice or by proving that the witness fell prey to tutoring and was influenced by someone else either by cross-examining such witness at length that leads to either material discrepancies or contradictions, or exposes a doubtful demeanour of such witness rife with sterile repetition and confidence lacking testimony, or through such degree of incompatibility of the version of the witness with the other material on record and attending circumstances that negates their presence as unnatural.

(XI) Merely because a child witness is found to be repeating certain parts of what somebody asked her to say is no reason to discard her testimony as tutored, if it is found that what is in substance being deposed by the child witness is something that he or she had actually witnessed. A child witness who has withstood his or her cross-examination at length and able to describe the scenario implicating the accused in detail as the author of crime, then minor discrepancies or parts of coached deposition that have crept in will not by itself affect the credibility of such child witness.

(XII) Part of the statement of a child witness, even if tutored, can be relied upon, if the tutored part can be separated from the untutored part, in case such remaining untutored or untainted part inspires confidence.

The untutored part of the evidence of the child witness can be believed and taken into consideration or the purpose of corroboration as in the case of a hostile witness."

72. In view of the above dictum of Hon'ble Supreme Court, we have gone through the testimony of PW-8, Krishna Kumar. At the time of incident, this witness was aged about seven years, eight months and 15 days. When the evidence of the child was recorded, he was aged about 11 years and six months. Before recording the evidence of PW-8, krishna Kumar, he was examined by the Trial Judge by putting certain questions and on being satisfied, the Trial Judge recorded his statement. In his evidence, he has supported the prosecution case. Although, he was subjected to lengthy cross-examination, but nothing adverse could be elicited from his mouth to make the prosecution story doubtful. Further, PW-8, Krishna Kumar is an injured witness and his presence at the place cannot be doubted.

73. Next argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is in respect of non-examination of one Komal in front of whose house, the occurrence took place and non-examination of length of Jamun tree.

74. This Court failed to notice as to what benefit learned counsel for the appellants want to derive from examining the length of Jamun tree. Moreover, PW-1, Devi Singh, who is also the first informant of the case, in his cross-examination which was recorded on 18.10.2012 has stated that he had enmity over the plot with Komal and Lakhmi. His elder brother Chhiddu Singh was issueless and he had given his land to Het Ram. For this land, a case was instituted by Komal and Lakhmi Singh against Het Ram, which ended in 1999 in favour of Het Ram. Since, Komal and first informant was in inimical terms, no occasions exists for the first informant to produce Komal as prosecution witness, rather accused-appellants should have produced him as defence witnesses.

75. So far as non-recovery of empty cartridge from the place of occurrence is concerned, it is of no help to the appellants. Weapon of assault, i.e. Daav and trident (trishul) have been recovered from appellant Lakhmi, and on the pointing out of the appellant Languria, knife and on the pointing out of the appellant Yogesh gun were recovered. Further, Dr. Surendra Goyal, who examined the injury of the injured PW-8, Krishna Kumar, opined that injury was caused by firearm. No suggestion was put to PW-5. Dr. Surendra Goyal, about non-presence of pellet in the injury.

76. Materials pertaining to Case Crime No. 400 of 2011, under Sections 302,307, 506 and 509 IPC and 4/25 Arms Act, containing six bundles dated 10.04.2012 were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory. Bundle No. 1 contain Trident

(Trishule), Bundle No.2 *Banka*, Bundle No. 3, knife, Bundle No. 4, Kurta Dhoti, Bundle No. 5, bloodstained earth and Bundle No. 6 simple earth. Aforesaid articles were examined by PW-10, Dr. Mahesh Prasad Sharma, Deputy Director, Forensic Science Laboratory. Articles kept in bundle Nos 1 to 6 were bloodstained. Articles kept in bundle Nos. 4 and 5 were having large bloodstained of 5 cm. Bundle Nos. 4 to 6 contained human blood. Blood on articles kept on bundle Nos. 1- 3 was disintegrated. Further bloodstained and simple earth pertaining to Case Crime No. 400 of 2011, under Sections 302, 307, 506, 509 IPC was examined by PW-11, Sudhir Kumar Jha, Senior Scientific Assistant, Lucknow. On examination, both bloodstained and simple earth were found the same, the report whereof was Ext. Ka-21.

77. We have carefully scrutinized and examined the evidence of prosecution witnesses and we find that they have been correctly marshalled and assessed by the kerned Trial Court. It was a gruesome murder, which was committed in a broad day light in which the deceased was hacked to death. In addition to the death of the deceased, PW-8, Krishna Kumar also received firearm injury on his leg.

78. In view of what has been indicated herein above, we are of the view that the prosecution has successfully proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt against all the accused persons under Sections 302/34, 509/34 IPC and 506 IPC. Conviction of the appellants Languri and Yogesh under Section 506 IPC is also upheld.

79. Accordingly, the instant criminal appeal is dismissed.

80. The appellants are in jail. They shall remain in jail to serve out the sentence awarded to them by the learned Trial Court.

81. Office is directed to send a copy of this order to the court concerned for compliance and compliance report be submitted to this Court within two months.

(Devendra Singh-I,J.) (Chandra Dhari Singh,J.)

March 18, 2026
Ishrat